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Mary Shelley's Frankenstein l provides an early
fictive exploration of ethical dilemmas springing from
a realization of the scientific power to create
bioengineered species. Through the characteristics
given Dr. Frankenstein and his creature, the novel
provides a fictive platform for analyzing both what
we take to be loci of value sufficient to command
human respect and the manner in which such matters
are to be decided.

Editors' Note: The following paper
coauthored by Professors Dandekar and
Zlotkowski, response by Professor
Westra, and reply by Dandekar and
Zlotkowski were presented at the Eastern
Division meetings of the Society for the
Study of Ethics and Animals, held in New
York City, New York, December, 1991.

The Novel
Originally conceived as an entertaining horror story,
this 19th-century work begins with a young man who
seems destined to enjoy the best things in life. Possessed
of good health, a loving family, devoted friends and
economic security, he is even assured that the woman
he loves loves him in retum. Embarking on a course of
scientific study, he wins the respect and honor of his
colleagues and academic superiors.
But Dr. Frankenstein wants more: he wants to
create a new form of life. Focussing his attention only
on this aim, he works in secret, giving no thought to a

Biogenetic engineering only very recently enabled
human beings to construct Iifeforms that would be
impossible except for scientific technology. The very
newness of these techniques and the obvious ways in
which the origin of "engineered" creatures derives from
the activities of human agents allows us to think about
questions derived from the discourse of environmental
ethics in a new way, for they force us to ask what are
the obligations humans owe to animals whose very
existence derives from human agency but whose lives
thereafter might possess intrinsic value to the animal,
beyond the instrumental values attributed by the
engineering perspective. 111inking about these creatures,
how shall we answer the basic questions of

PHILOSOPHY

1) whether and to what extent human obligations
with regard to animals are owed directly to the
animals and
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creator's responsibilities to his creature or to the
effect that creature's needs might have on his own
species. Eager to break boundaries hallowed by
culturally set limits, he dismisses these as "superstition." Yet, when he succeeds, the creature's
otherness horrifies and repels him. He rejects this
creature of his making and apparently expects it just
to die or disappear. Such an expectation may sound
naive, but at bottom it accurately reflects the
assumptions about scientific mastery that presume
scientific power enables the scientifically competent
to control undesired consequences of scientific
progress as well as tlle desired ones.
The fallacy of expecting that the power to realize
one's desires will coincide with control is fully
demonstrated in the novel. Despite being (by human
standards) horrifyingly ugly, the creature proves notjust
viable but uniquely hardy and intelligent. Treated
cruelly by every human who sees it, it understandably
grows enraged at the species that simply assumes a right
to abuse it. It wants a share of happiness for itself, and
by this it means companionship from a female of its
own kind, one who will not be horrified by its
appearance, one who can share its activities. Finally,
on Mont Blanc, it manages to trap its maker into facing
squarely what he has done. "We are bound by
indissoluble ties," the creature insists; "you must do
your duty by me."
Moved by the creature's arguments, Dr. Frankenstein
assents: "For the first time I felt what the duties of a
creator toward his creation were, and that I ought to
render him happy"(87). He undertakes to provide the
creature with a female of its kind. But then, on reflection,
the doctor decides he cannot risk providing reproductive
capacities to tllis "unnatural" being. Instead, he decides
he must safeguard the well-being and capacity for
happiness of his own species. As he says in summary
toward the end of his life,

But the doctor's decision to break faith with his
reature does not break the bond between them. Instead,
it locks creator and creation into an irremediably
destructive relationship consuming the remainder of
both their lives.
Thus tlle pattern of the novel clearly raises two
closely related questions:

I created a rational creature and was bound
towards him, to a<;sure, as far as was in my
power, his happiness and well being. This was
my duty; but there was another still paramount
to that. My duty towards the beings of my own
species had greater claims to my attention
because they included a greater proportion of
happiness or misery.... I refused, and I did
right in refusing, to create a companion for
the first creature. (187)

Separately and together, the stages of Frankenstein's
story illustrate many aspects of the mainstream Western
attitude toward nature. Dr. Frankenstein explicitly seeks
to justify his practice by reference to the traditional
utilitarian position that maximizing human happiness
so far outweighs other values that the nonhuman must
be properly regarded as just a resource for the human.
Dr. Frankenstein seems to be working from within the
mainstream tradition uniting the presumption that
humans are entitled to dominate the eartll with values
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(l) What do hmnan beings owe to nonhuman, humancreated species;

(2) How do such obligations weigh against those
owed to our own human species?
In exploring these issues, the novel moves through three
stages. First, Dr. Frankenstein, unhindered by moral
scruples, seeks to exercise scientific expertise without
limit. Fearing public scrutiny might prohibit his quest,
he conducts his experiments in secret. In simply
arrogating to himself a private right to experiment as he
pleases, he implicitly rips himself out of the sustaining
nexus both of nature and of human community. He gives
absolutely no thought to the social responsibilities he
will incur if he should, in fact, succeed.
In stage two, confronted by a being capable of
articulating its own needs from its own point of view,
he becomes aware of his duty to enable this creature to
achieve satisfaction on its own terms. He now accepts
his creature's claim to rights and contracts in
acknowledgement of the direct obligations owing to
the creature.
However, in stage three the doctor retreats to an
antllfopocentric fear that the creature's self-sufficiency
might prove inimical to his own species continuance.
Moved by what he sees as species loyalty, he refuses to
allow his creature to achieve reproductive capability.
Dr. Frankenstein's Characteristics
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that the quest for scientific know ledge is a selflegitimating good.

supporting scientific progress, capitalism and what
Lugones and Spelman2 have named cultural impelialism.
Furthermore, altllough Dr. Frankenstein specifically
rejects religion, his uncritical acceptance of what must
be recognized as the presumption iliat human good is
entitled to dominate over ilie good of tlle nonhumanwhenever iliese are in conflict-has sources not only
in tlle secular humanist tradition deriving from tlle
Greeks and the scientific outlook but also in the repeated
authorizations of ilie Old Testament. Here, male and
female are appointed to "subdue" ilie earth and "rule
over ilie fish in tlle sea, ilie birds of heaven and every
living iliing iliat moves on earth" (Genesis 1:28-9).
Humans as a species are given dominion over all
nonhuman occupants of every environmental niche.
However, iliis general auiliorization is transformed in
ilie Garden of Eden story. There ilie Creator empowers
Adam, the male human, to name all oilier creatures,
including woman. In this version the male has primacy,
ilie female being created to make him happy, to be his
companion, to fulfill his need for companionship
(Genesis 2: 19-23).
After the Flood NOall and his sons are given ilie
most sweeping auiliorization of all:

Life and deaili appeared to me ideal bounds
which I should first break through, and pour a
torrent of light into our dark world. (45)
Because he presumes his quest good in itself, he
unquestioningly pursues exploitation of every scientific
possibility, acting as if unhindered by
(a) any moral ret1ection on probable consequences,
(b) any respect for the sensibilities of the nonscientific public, or
(c) any sense that the nonhuman might itself be
owed respect.
In ilie body of the novel, the first and last of these tllfee
evasions receive explicit treatment. In Stage II the
creature argues Dr. Frankenstein into seeing that the
nonhuman might be owed respect. But tlle doctor, after
promising to provide the creature wiili companionship
of its own kind, reflects further on the probable
consequences of this action and in Stage III comes to
sacrifice his own chances of happiness to a moral
heroism aimed at safeguarding humanity. Since the
middle term, respect for the sensibilities of the
nonscientific public, never receives its due, tlle pattern
of obligation is never fully explored or mapped. But
much can be learned nonetheless.

Be fruitful.. .and fill tlle earth. The fear and
dread of you shall fall upon all wild animals
on earili, on all birds of heaven, on everytlling
that moves upon the ground and all fish in ilie
sea; they are given into your hands. Every
creature iliat lives and moves shall be food for
you; I give you tllem all, as once I gave you
all green plants ... But you must be fruitful
... swarm throughout the eartll and rule over
it. (Genesis 9: 1-7)

Obligation to the Nonhuman

Stage I
Rejecting religion in his commitment to rationality and
science, Dr. Frankenstein nonetlleless unret1ectively
accepts tlle Biblical premise which autllOrizes man, the
male, to rule over tlle eartll, to use it and every living
creature in every environmental niche to increase human
thriving. His presumption is complemented by tlle
anthropocentric premisses of tlle Greek and Roman
world which held, as Aristotle bluntly put it, tllat "otller
animals exist for tlle sake of man ... "3
Dr. Frankenstein also illustrates otller aspects of tlle
mainstream Westem attitude toward nature. In Stage I
he is the scientific expert who assumes a right to
unmonitored experimentation, presumably believing
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In his total disregard of any obligations concerning
the treatment of nonhuman beings, Frankenstein may
be seen as a Cartesian, for Descartes so fully
distinguished ilie body and mind tlmt animal suffering
was considered an oxymoron. In tlle Cartesian view,
"ilie body is regarded as a machine which, having been
made by the hands of God, is ... better arranged"4 but
no different in kind from machines produced by human
ingenuity. Indeed, since only the human soul, the ghost
in the machine, earns living human bodies special
treatment, even hwnan bodies, lacking souls, merit little
intrinsic respect. The evidence of tlle senses, human or

211

Between the Species

Moral Issues Associated with Bioengineered Species: Stewardship, Abuse and Sustainability

Were this all, the interlude on Mont Blanc might be
seen as a call to reembrace stewardship, caring and
concem for the nonhuman on the grounds of the ultimate
dependence of the whole of nature on our exercise of
rule for tile common good. From this perspective, the
creature's charge to Doctor Frankenstein resembles Joel
Feinberg's analysis of the duties of stewardship where
he argues:

animal, must be rejected as untrustworthy in compatison
with the purely rational. So, human technologyinsofar as it is applied to the nonhuman-is freed of
nontechnical (i.e., moral) limits.
Post-Cartesian technological progress may be
described as the efficient use of natural systems viewed
as machinery. As Susan Griffin 5 has observed, this
technological outIook promotes its own verification.
Where mountains are seen as storehouses of coal, one
acts reasonably when one efficientIy removes coal by
cutting away half tile mountainside. It is an unintended
and inconsequential side effect that the mountain erodes;
chemicals pollute its streams; fish, plants and animals
die. Technological enterprise fully succeeds on its own
term-the mountain is just what Cartesian science
believed it actually was: dead matter with a value
adequately determined by tile price paid in tile human
commodities market.

Individual animals can have rights but it is
implausible to ascribe to them a right to life
on the human model. Nor do we normally
have duties to keep individual animals alive
or even to abstain from killing them provided
we do it humanely and nonwantonly in the
promotion oflegitimate human interests. On
the other hand, we do have duties to protect
threatened species, not duties to the species
themselves as such, but rather duties to future
human beings, duties derived from our
housekeeping role as temporary inhabitants
of this planet. 6
Until very recentIy, objections to tile presumption that
natural resources are simply to be exploited without limit
largely followed versions of this principle of indirect
obligation, where all value remains centered on human
instrumentality. The value of the nonhuman derives from
the human recognition tIlat we cannot survive the loss of
(some crucial aspects 00 an increasingly fragile biotic
substrate. 11le rainforest is valued because it provides us
with oxygen; the biotic diversity within it has provided
us with pharmacological treasures; and its unknown,
uncatalogued species might well provide future
generations with far more than previous generations have
already exploited. Restraint follows from the specifically
anthropocentric perspective underlying Locke's
constraining lie natural right to property with conditions
rejecting wanton waste, and tile Lockean demand that
humans leave enough for tile heritage of humankindquantitatively and qualitatively-as they themselves
enjoyed. In short, constraints on our behavior with respect
to the nonhuman ultimately detive from our estimate of
what is owing to tile human.
With respect to animals who display sensitivity to
pain and suffering, the anthropocentric perspective is
best captured by Kant's explanation of an "indirect
obligation" which translates caring for animals into a
duty to humans.

P.ic~rd Huber, ~
.Q.f F:in.tasti·c :!.~~ ~'t'";:-_~lcl:i:=i!ol
C:'"ea~::res.

New YorI:o Dover,

~

Stage II
If Dr. Frankenstein is the scientist-technician
bending dead matter to his will, his creature may be
seen as tIlat estranged and technologically alienated
Other, the nonhuman given tile fictive gift of speaking
about its needs and potential. When they first confront
each other on Mont Blanc, they are already caught in a
mutually destructive pattern analogous to the destructive
practices of industrial polluters who fill their own
environment with carcinogens. Only here, in tile novel,
this nonhuman, alienated otIlerexcels at self-expression.
It articulates an alternative point of view, rejecting the
assumption that what is not human is tIlerefore to be
understood as dead matter. Instead, it reminds us that it
is human ilTesponsibility that has brought us to this pass.
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So, the principle cited by Feinberg, tlle principle which
requires humans to use power nonwantonly, to serve
as stewards who benefit tlle nonhuman so as to serve
the human, grounds tlle claim made by the creature
on its creator. This fully accords with tlle Kantian
principle of indirect obligation to the nonhuman.
Humans ought to treat animals with clemency because
to do otherwise results in a human hardening that will
affect human-human interactions. This principle, were
it to persist unmodified, would replace tlle criterion
of efficient commodification with a principle of
stewardship. The relationship of dominion would be
interpreted as excluding exploitation but including
nonwanton, caring use.
We can see this as tlle better altemative inasmuch

control/stewardship has become inescapable. Today,
even the survival of wildemess depends on human
decisions, a form of wilderness management.
Endangered species persist only through human
interventions reparative of earlier human interventions. As science enables human technology to
make the nonhuman into an other, and to distort
further the earth's .bionet, its future sustainability
becomes, as the creature putS it, "bound (to us) by
indissoluble ties.~'
But Frankenstein's creature, tllOugh it apparently
accepts tlle anthropocentric outlook, nevertheless
demands that its maker directly recognize its needs in
such a way tllat this new lifeform need not remain
within even a benevolent stewardship. Together witll
a companion, it wishes to depart and follow its own
lights. If it undertakes to avoid humanity so as to do
no damage to human activity, it also proposes to be
free from the bond of its origin, the bond of human
stewardship which validates human dominion. Hence,
in arguing for a chance to work out its destiny by
means of a nonharmful independence, tlle creature
touches on another possible way to formulate the
obligation of humans to the nonhuman. From this
perspective humans ought to recognize limits to tlleir
treattnent of the nonhuman because nonhuman entities
have claims directly on us-the principle of direct
obligation to the nonhuman. It is this second principle
that Aldo Leopold, ill his famous essay, "The Land
Ethic," refers to as "a matter of biotic right."g
Dr. Frankenstein, in this second stage of the novel,
is challenged to face a crucial issue which in current
ecological thinking is embodied in two radical

as human actions premised on an unlimited exploitation

alternatives:

[A man] must practice kindness towards
animals, for he who is cruel to animals
becomes hard also in his dealings with men.?
Indeed, even Frankenstein's creature declares itself
willing to accept the anthropocentric perspective
whereby obligation to the nonhuman derives indirectly
and must accord with obligation to the human. In asking
Dr. Frankenstein to provide it with a companion like
itself, it describes its vision of happiness as one which
will not injure any human. From tllat perspective it
warns Dr. Frankenstein:
The picture I present to you is peaceful and
humane and you must feel that you could deny
it only in the wantonness of power and
cruelty.(126)

of the nonhuman have already distorted the earth's selfregulating biotic net into mutually destructive pattems.
However, actions premised on a duty of stewardship
for the sake of human good, while tlley would limit
exploitation, would in tlleir own way also distort the
bionet. Whether agricultural practices are chemically
dependent or utilize biological pest controls, they
effectively change tlle environment. Domestic animals
obviously have been molded to dependency on tlle
human as they were bred to serve human designs.
Naturally occurring plants have been selectively bred
and cross-bred till tlley too depend for viability on
human stewardship.
Remarkably, even when the nonhuman is not
actively molded to achieve some human good, human
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1) expanding tlle antluopocentric circle so tllat

nonhumans (and exploited humans) can bOtll be
accorded moral status and treated as recipients
of friendship by right rather tllan by sentimental
grant or
2) replacing completely the anthropocentric
principle itself.
The challenge lies, to cite Tom Regan, in establishing
an "ethic of the environment rather than an etllicfor the
use of tlle environment.9 In posing tlle request to be
freed from stewardship to find its own happiness, tlle
creature calls on us to investigate
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and participation in a moral community, what will be
our responsibilities to this new species? If we fear such
a creature while it is still dependent on our goodwill,
does that excuse us from the obligation to forward its
thriving, even if we fear tllat its species thriving might
eventually threaten the continued thriving of our own
species, make our dominion over the nonhuman
unsustainable, or even replace us in tlle biotic net which,
by our own agency, is no longer independent of our
stewardship and goodwill?
And if an engineered life-form has some, but not
all, of the relevant characteristics--so that it is capable
of flourishing but incapable of participating in
promise-keeping or the other institutions of a moral
community-should its capacities suffice to command
respect from us? Dr. Frankenstein's solution precludes
the latter problem, for he chooses to privilege human
tllfiving most of all and to deny the creature any chance
at happiness if that poses tlle risks of reproduction and
subsequent species independence from human control.
TIle unfortunate doctor maintains the correctness of his
choice until the very end. His choice is presented as
heroic-a refusal to betray the greater good. Yet the
author gives the final word to the creature, who claims
with reason that "Blasted as thou wert., my agony was still
superior to thine." The scientifically misshapen creation
shows a degree of understanding superior to its maker's.
There is in this a degree of hope and a clue to the
persistent wrongness which, unnoticed, distorts all the
phases of Dr. Frankenstein's development throughout
the novel. As we noticed earlier, he unquestioningly
pursues exploitation of scientific possibility, acting as
if unhindered by

What loci of value command moral respect?
Of what significance...are such characteristics
as being alive, sentience, having interests,
autonomy, the capacity to participate in a
moral community, organic or systemic
integrity and flourishing?
Fictional though it may be, this creature possesses every
element which has been suggested as a locus of value
commanding moral respect. Demonstrably alive and
sentient, it recognizes and defends its own interests.
For good or for evil, it exercises autonomy as humans
do. Moreover, it demonstrates the capacity to participate
in a moral conununity as well as an organic or systemic
integrity and the capacity for flourishing. On this basis
it demands of its creator no less and no more than the
relevant necessities of its flourishing. At a minimum, it
requires a companion, a female of its own kind. In effect,
it asks of Dr. Frankenstein that he be as benevolent a
creator as God was to Adam in the Garden of Eden.
But the Creature intends to be an Adam that willingly
chooses expulsion from that garden. It does not ask for
Frankenstein's continued stewardship but for equal
rights to self-determination.
Having all of the characteristics which supposedly
underlie the human claim to dignity and value, Le., being
alive and sentient, possessed of intrinsic interests,
capable of exercising autonomy, capable ofparticipating
in a moral community, possessed of organic or systemic
integrity and the capacity for flourishing, the creature
would most likely be accounted "human" on Kantian
grounds. But Dr. Frankenstein, speaking for his time
and very likely for our own, cannot account a creature
of his own devising, a product of bioengineering rather
than of human birth, as a being of intrinsic value,
commanding respect like himself.

a) any moral reflection on probable consequences,
b) any respect for the sensibilities of the nonscientific
public, or

Stage III
In his ultimate denial of the creature's demands Dr.
Frankenstein implicitly refers to the subtext of much
current ecological debate: what do we owe future
generations? In light of the creature's potential we must
ask who comprises these future generations: is it only
human future generations?
In this regard, the creature raises issues which are
especially relevant in light of the increasing potential
ofbiogenetic engineering. If we create some complex
new form of life, capable of autonomy, development
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c) any sense that the nonhuman might itselfbe owed
respect.
Confronted by the creature, he is forced to acknowledge
that at least some portion of the nonhuman might itself
be owed respect. Persuaded to fulfill the creature's
needs, he reconsiders and then reneges, not for personal
gain or glory but out of species loyalty-heroically
accepting the worst because for the first time he does
engage in moral reflection on probable consequences.
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understanding of life as an interconnected web: We are
bound by indissoluble ties. But we must still think
about whether our situation ought to be one of
dominion, be it a rule of exploitation or the more
moderate rule of stewardship. Alternatively, would it
be better to strive for a relationship captured by some
less hierarchical description?
Dr. Frankenstein will not consult the superstitious
mob whose happiness he decides to protect. His elitism
is falsely generalized to humanity. But would the
outcome have been different if he or the creature had
petitioned humanity directly?
As depicted, the nonscientific public hardly
commands respect. It abuses the creature only because
it perceives it as ugly. But rejection of the Other, thanks
to a body aesthetic that produces aversive reactions, is
not limited to Dr. Frankenstein's creature. Ageism and
ableism are also connected wiili a deeply felt aversion
and nervousness evoked by the presence of the old and
the disabled in terms of a body aestlletic, a culturally
constructed sense so pervasive that members of
culturally imperialized groups often exhibit themselves
symptoms of aversion toward members of their own
and other oppressed groups. Blacks, for example, not
infrequently differentiate in a color-valorizing manner
between "light-skinned" and" dark-skinned." II
If, as seems probable, the perception of ugliness is,
wiili respect to tlle creature, a perception of otherness
which comes so close to our own somewhat shaky
boundaries as to evoke aversion and disgust, then the
creature could scarcely hope for just treatment if Dr.
Frankenstein did ask other antllropocentric, fearful
humans to help him determine its fate. Such consultation
would have done little more than diffuse the resultant
guilt wiili a fallacious appeal to tlle auiliority of the many.
However, it seems probable that the habit of nonconsultation reflects a habit of noncooperation and a
devaluing of the positive potential of political discourse,
a presumption of lie superiority of an expert's opinion.
This disrespect for lie oilier, be it hwnan or nonhwnan,
is an implicit, unremarked wrongness which ultimately
pervades the text and distorts possibilities. Were it to be
replaced by a willingness to cooperate with those
characterized by "otllerness" from tlle perspective of tlle
technologically proficient, scientifically empowered
human, then perhaps dominion might be replaced with
sharing in ways that would sustain us, human and
nonhwnan, witll more compassion and clemency and
justice tllan Dr. Frankenstein could muster.

However, never once throughout the novel does this
scientific expert acknowledge or show any sensitivity
to the sensibilities of the nonscientific public.
Dr. Frankenstein has progressed from a paradigm of
exploitation to one of stewardship a5 the proper mode
by which humans would exercise dominion over the
earth. But the question remains to be asked: do hwnans,
per se, legitimately exercise dominion over the earth (and
the nonhuman inhabitants thereof) either as exploiters
or as good stewards? With respect to tllis issue, current
practice, whether exploitive or stewardlike, reveals an
obfuscation. Not every human is dominant over tlle eartll
and the nonhuman. Only some, dominant groups
instantiate that position. These dominant groups alone
generally dominate over tlle earth, the nonhuman and
that portion of tlle human which is not part of tlle
dominant group. In practice, science coordinates wiili
capitalism and "development" to promote institutions in
which some human beings are, like much of the "natural
world," exploited as resources for others. In order to claim
that hwnan domination is human, the dominant group
must falsely universalize its own position and claim iliat
what is true of it is true of hwnans generically.
This aspect of technological thinking can be called
cultural imperialism. Young lO has described this process
as marking out
the difference of women from men, American
Indians or Africans from Europeans, Jews from
Christians, homosexual from heterosexuals,
workers from professionals ... reconstructed
largely as deviance and inferiority. Since only
the dominant group's cultural expressions
receive wide dissemination, their cultural
expressions become the ... universal, and
thereby the unremarkable. Given tlle normality
of its own cultural expressions and identity,
the dominant group constructs the differences
which some groups exhibit a5lack and negation.
These groups become marked as Other.
Ecofeminists bring together feminist insight into
cultural imperialism with ecological concern for the
environment to structure a critique of technological
practices that tend toward the commodification of
otherness. Unlike the ecological positions which
promote recognition of human obligations of
stewardship toward the nonhuman, for whatever reason,
ecofeminists seek to establish an anti-hierarchical
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Responlse:

A partial version of this paper was presented at
tile TIlird Conference on Agriculture, Food and
Human Values Society, Varieties of Sustain-

Dr. Frankenstein and
Today's ProfE~ssional
Biotechnologist:
A Failed An.3Iogy?

ability, Reflecting on Ethics, Environment and
Economic Equity, Asilomar Conference Center,
Pacific Grove, California, May 10-12, 1991.
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